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THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AT 70—ARTICLE 10†
Nick Minogue*
Article 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European
State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this
Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by
depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the
United States of America. The Government of the United States of
America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such
instrument of accession.1

When Montenegro deposited the instrument of accession to the North
Atlantic Treaty (“Treaty”) with the U.S. Department of State on June 5, 2017, it
became the twenty-ninth Party to the Treaty, and the seventieth to accede under
its Article 10.2 At the time of writing, and following the agreement between
Athens and Skopje on the resolution of the name issue, Allies are in the process
of signing the accession protocol for the future Republic of North Macedonia
with a view to it, under its new name, becoming the thirtieth.3
Citing Euro-Atlantic integration’s role in anchoring democracy and the rule
of law and strengthening peace, cooperation and stability in Europe, nations
have consistently lauded the Alliance’s Open Door policy under Article 10 of
the Treaty as one of its great successes.4 Accordingly, the Allies view Article 10
as one of the core tools by which the treaty achieves the purpose of the Alliance,
even as this purpose has evolved from the Cold War context in which it was
founded, and the corresponding focus on self-defense, to the modern, more
multifaceted approach to safeguarding security presented by the 2010 Strategic
Concept.5 In this regard Article 10 operates hand in glove with Article 3 of the
†
This Article contains views provided in the author’s personal capacity and may not reflect agreed upon
policy or views of the NATO International Staff or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
*
Assistant Legal Adviser, NATO International Staff Office of Legal Affairs.
1
North Atlantic Treaty, art. 10, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
2
Montenegro Joins NATO as 29th Ally, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jun. 5, 2017), https://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_144647.htm?selectedLocale=en.
3
Relations with the Republic of North Macedonia, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (FEB. 15, 2019),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48830.htm?selectedLocale=en.
4
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10; For example, in the 2015 NAC statement to mark the
anniversary of the then three latest rounds of accession in 2014, and most recently in the 2018 Brussels Summit
Declaration.
5
See Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the
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Treaty, providing a means of extending the inherent stability represented by the
increasing integration and cohesiveness of the Allies’ security structures.
Whilst Article 10 is not without questions of legal interpretation, its
relatively brief content belies the detailed procedures developed by the Alliance
since the Treaty’s entry into force to provide a pathway to accession. Similarly,
accession to the Treaty is only one element of the legal obligations and political
commitments that a State must undertake before it is able to operate as an
effective member of NATO.
This Article will, therefore, in addition to examining Article 10 itself, focus
on the policies and practices that have evolved to govern accession to the
Alliance over the seven rounds of enlargement since the Treaty entered into
force, as well as the content of the so-called Treaty legal acquis, and the
mechanisms by which it binds States newly acceded to the Treaty.
A. Drafting History of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty
According to a contemporaneous U.S. record of the Treaty negotiations, the
seven participating governments saw the need for an accession provision from
the outset, believing that, “a North Atlantic security system, to be fully effective,
should provide not only for their own security but for that of other countries in
the general North Atlantic area whose security was intrinsically and strategically
interdependent with their own.”6 At the same time, the participating
governments recognized that not all such States would be able to become part of
the Alliance from the beginning, either because the governments of such States
might not initially be prepared to assume the necessary responsibilities of the
Alliance, or due to lack of agreement amongst the seven Governments
themselves.7
An accession provision was thus seen as necessary to avoid closing the door
to future membership of the Alliance for those states, although the precise
content of what became Article 10 was developed only later in the negotiations.8

Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO SUMMIT (Nov. 19–20, 2010), https://www.nato.int/
strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf.
6
John F. Hickman, North Atlantic Pact: The Drafting of the Treaty, PACT D-6/1, at 28 (Mar. 29, 1949).
7
Id.
8
Id.
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The final text of Article 10 comprises essentially four elements:
1. Procedure for Accession
Article 10 confirms that accession is only at the invitation of the Parties to
the Treaty, and that once invited, a State may become party by depositing its
instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America—
the registry for the Treaty—who would inform each of the Parties of the deposit
of each such instrument.9
These procedural elements were all present in the first draft of the Article
considered in negotiations, with the exception of the identity of the depository
State, later confirmed as the United States.10 Section C below sets out how these
elements have been built upon over successive accession rounds into the
considerably more detailed practice followed today.
2. Voting Rule
Article 10 specifies that unanimous agreement of the Parties is required to
extend an invitation to accede to the Treaty.11 This represents the only reference
to a voting rule in the Treaty and was reportedly chosen by the drafters due to
the impact of new membership on the obligations of the existing Parties.12
The Alliance’s practice has been to enshrine the decision to invite in an
accession protocol to the Treaty itself, thus requiring the agreement of all. As
such, the question in principle of whether unanimity could be reached in the face
of an abstention will never arise in practice.13
3. Limitation to European States
Article 10 limits a potential invitation to any other “European State,” and
provides no definition of “European” to clarify its intended scope.14 The first
draft of the accession article limited invitations to any other country in the
“North Atlantic or Western European regions,” but this was reportedly

9
10
11
12
13
14

North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1 at art. 10.
Hickman, supra note 6; North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10.
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1 at art. 10.
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1; Hickman supra note 6 at ¶ 29.
As would be the case, for example, within the Council of the European Union.
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10.
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considered by the negotiators as too limited, as was the subsequent draft’s
reference to “any other neighbouring State.”15
The reference to “North Atlantic” was also dropped because Canada and the
United States would be initial signatories and other American countries were
actual or potential Parties to the Rio Treaty.16 By February 22, 1949, the drafters
had settled on the reference to “any other European State,” as included in the
final text.17
There is some evidence that the Allies interpret the reference to “European
State” relatively broadly, and independently of the definition of “Europe” in
Article 6. Whilst the accession protocol for the Republic of Turkey supplements
Article 6’s reference to the territory of any of the Parties in Europe with an
express reference to the territory of Turkey, the protocol makes no similar
amendment to Article 10.18 Thus, whilst the then Allies evidently felt that at least
some clarification was needed to avoid any uncertainty over whether Article 5
applied to all parts of Turkish territory, they implicitly understood the Republic
of Turkey to fulfil the definition of a “European State” for the purposes of Article
10.19 Similarly, Georgia’s geographical position to the east of Turkey has not
prevented Allies from envisaging its accession.20
At the same time, a different approach to Article 6 and Article 10 can be
readily explained at a practical level, leaving aside questions of interpretation.
With an invitation to accede requiring the agreement of all, there can be no
question following an accession that the Allies considered that Article 10 has
been satisfied. In contrast, agreement over an accession does not settle the
question of the extent to which Article 6 is considered to encompass an Ally’s
territory, which explains the imperative to put the matter beyond doubt in the
drafting of Article 6 itself.

15

Hickman, supra note 6, at 29.
See id.; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), art. 5, Sept. 2, 1947, T.I.A.S.
No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Treaty].
17
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10; Hickman, supra note 6.
18
See Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, art. 2, Oct. 17,
1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S. 350.
19
See id.
20
See Bucharest Summit Declaration, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Apr. 3, 2008), https://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm?selectedLocale=en.
16

MINOGUEPROOFS2_10.24.19

2019]

10/28/2019 2:30 PM

ARTICLE 10

169

4. Conditions for Invitation
Article 10 contains two further broad conditions that must be fulfilled before
a State is invited to accede. Firstly, the State must be in a position to further the
principles of the Treaty.21 Secondly, the State must be in a position to contribute
to the security of the North Atlantic Area.22
The conditions encompass both a political and a military strategic element.
Both conditions, and the practical effect given to them in the pathway to
accession developed by the Alliance, are considered in more detail in Section B
below.
The political element requires an analysis of the commitment of the potential
invitee to the shared values of the Allies as expressed in the Treaty, and
particularly in its preamble.23
There is a potential ambiguity to the military and strategic element, which
could be read as reflecting the need to assess either a State’s specific capacity to
contribute to the common defense and other activities of the Alliance, or the
military and security implications of its accession for the North Atlantic Area in
a broader sense. As will be seen infra, the principles presently applied by the
Allies in considering an invitation to accede encompass both these assessments.
B. Current Practice—Principles Governing Accession
Rooted in the 1990s, the modern expression of the Alliance’s Open Door
policy, and the principles applied in deciding to extend an invitation to accede,
paved the way for the accessions of the first former Soviet States to join the
Alliance.
At the Brussels Summit of January 1994, Allied leaders reaffirmed the
Alliance was open to membership of other European States in a position to
further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to security in the North
Atlantic Area.24 Recognizing the need for greater transparency on the principles
and practice that would govern this new phase in Alliance accession policy,
Allied Foreign Ministers in December 1994 commissioned what would become

21

North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10.
Id.
23
See id. at pmbl.
24
Press Release, NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, ¶ 12 (JULY 11, 2018) [hereinafter Brussels
Summit], ¶ 12 (Jan. 11, 1994).
22
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the Alliance’s 1995 “Study on Enlargement” to set out the principles that would
govern decisions regarding accession.25 The Study was first shared with
interested Partners in September 1995 and made public thereafter. Whilst the
drafters of the Study were careful to confirm that neither the criteria to be applied
nor the procedure to be followed were set in stone,26 the principles identified in
the Study remain the basis for the Alliance’s approach to inviting new members
to join.
The Study confirms NATO’s broad characterization of security as
embracing political, economic and defense components, and frames
enlargement as enhancing security by complementing wider trends towards
integration in the region, notably the enlargement of the European Union and
the strengthening of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). 27 Enlargement would offer new members the benefits of common
defense and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic Institutions, whilst at
the same time achieving NATO’s wider objectives of integration into the
community of values and institutions, and, thus, enhancing the stability and
security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.28
Beyond these more strategic objectives, the Study sets out a number of
specific aims for enlargement. Whilst those include emphasizing the benefits of
common defense and strengthening the Alliance’s ability to contribute to
European and international security, the majority of aims represent the more
political benefits of democratic and military integration and reform, and of
fostering the habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building.29
The Study contains no fixed list of criteria by which an assessment of the
two conditions in Article 10—that the State must be in a position to further the
principles of the Treaty and that the State must be in a position to contribute to
the security of the North Atlantic Area—will be carried out.30
At the same time, in various places in the text, the Study points to certain
key principles to be applied to accessions, and certain factors that will be taken
into account as Nations consider a possible invitation to accede. The paragraphs
below, whilst not seeking to be exhaustive, draw from the Study some
25

Final Communiqué, Dec. 1, 1994, at ¶¶ 5–8.
Study on NATO Enlargement, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. ¶¶ 7, 79–82 (Sept. 3, 1995),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm.
27
Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.
28
Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
29
Id at ¶ 3.
30
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10; Study on NATO Enlargement, supra note 26.
26
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overarching principles, and some that can be broadly categorized by reference
to one of the two Article 10 conditions.
Thus, by way of key overarching principles, the Study confirms:







that enlargement should be on the basis that new Members will enjoy
all the rights and assume all obligations of membership under the
Treaty; and accept and conform with the principles, policies and
procedures adopted by all Members of the Alliance at the time that
new Members join;31
that new Members should become familiar with the Alliance decision
making process, and the modalities and traditions of consensus and
compromise before joining, and commit themselves to good faith
efforts to build consensus within the Alliance on all issues;32
that no country outside the Alliance should be given a veto or droit de
regard over the process and decisions of enlargement;33 and
that the Alliance expects new Members not to “close the door” to the
accession of one or more later candidate Members.34

With respect to the furtherance of the principles of the Treaty—the first limb of
the Article 10 test—the Study emphasizes the need for a candidate State—
referred to in the Study as an “aspirant”—to:





31

adhere to and promote the purposes and principles of the United
Nations Charter, and conform to the principles of democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law;35
demonstrate a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by
economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility;36
have established appropriate democratic and civilian control of their
defense force;37
commit to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and specifically to
settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by

Study on NATO Enlargement, supra note 26, ¶ 4.
Id ¶¶ 45, 70.
33
Id ¶ 27.
34
Id ¶¶ 30, 70.
35
Id at ¶¶ 4 ,70 (which principles reflect directly the preamble of the Washington Treaty); See North
Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1 at pmbl.
36
Study on NATO Enlargement, supra note 26, ¶ 72.
37
Id.
32
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peaceful means;38 and
resolve by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles any
ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes or internal jurisdictional
disputes, with resolution of such disputes specified as a factor to be
taken into account before an invitation to accede is advanced, and not
solely as a commitment for the future.39

With respect to a State being in a position to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic Area—the second limb of the Article 10 test—the Study confirms
the importance of a new State’s commitment to maintaining the effectiveness of
the Alliance by sharing roles, risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits of
assuring common security goals and objectives.40 Specifically, the Study
confirms that Allies will want to know how aspirants intend to:





contribute to NATO’s collective defense, and how they will
participate in the integrated military structure and collective defense
planning process;41
be assimilated into NATO force structures and stationing,42 taking
into account the imperative of achieving as swiftly as possible at least
the minimum level of interoperability required for military
effectiveness;43 and
contribute to peacekeeping and other missions.44

The Study makes clear that an aspirant’s willingness and ability to meet its
accession commitments, not only on paper but in practice, will be a critical factor
in any decision taken by the Alliance to invite a country to join.45
At the same time, and in an echo of the convictions of the original drafters
of the Treaty, the Study confirms that beyond the specific political
characteristics, military capabilities and intentions of an aspirant State, the
Alliance should look holistically at the effects of the accession decision-making
process on European security and stability.46 This should include consideration

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id ¶ 5.
Id ¶ 6.
Id ¶ 5.
Id ¶¶ 45, 47.
Id ¶¶ 53–61.
Id ¶ 78.
Id at ch. 4.
Id ¶ 69.
See Hickman, supra note 6.
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of the impact on NATO’s relations with other European states, whether partners
or not, as well as on the security of States which may not themselves be
prospective NATO members.47 These considerations should also take into
account the impact the timing of an accession might have on the European
security environment.48
The 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration confirmed the Allies commitment
“to the integration of those countries that aspire to join the Alliance, judging
each on its merits.”49 At that time, four partner countries had declared their
aspirations to NATO membership.50 The Allies at the 2008 Bucharest Summit
had agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would become Members of the Alliance.51
In December 2018, Allied Foreign Ministers confirmed that NATO was ready
to accept the submission of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first Annual National
Program under the Membership Action Plan.52 Finally, and as noted above, at
the time of writing the Allies have just signed the Accession Protocol for the
accession of the future Republic of North Macedonia.53 Each of these aspirant
States are at different stages in what has evolved to be the modern NATO
accession process, and this process is described in more detail in the Section
below.
C. Current Practice—The Process to Accession
Article 10 itself provides no detail as to the practical steps that proceed a
formal invitation to accede, and the Study is careful to confirm that the
modalities for enlargement will be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account the prevailing political and security context and individual
circumstances and characteristics of new acceding members.54 It emphasizes
that previous accessions need not be considered as precise models, and that it is,
therefore, important to have a transparent and predictable process in order to
provide reassurance to public and legislative opinion in existing Member
States.55
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id ¶¶ 13,29.
Id ¶ 3.
See Brussels Summit, supra note 24.
See id. ¶¶ 64–65.
See id. ¶¶ 65–66.
See id. ¶ 64.
See Relations with the Republic of North Macedonia, supra note 3; Brussels Summit, supra note 24,

62–63.
54
55

See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10; Study on NATO Enlargement, supra note 26.
See Brussels Summit, supra note 24
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To meet this objective, the Organization has developed a graduated process
of integration and dialogue with aspirant states, to ensure that by the time an
invitation is issued the new Member is ready to take on their responsibilities
within the Alliance and to allow for Allies to be assured that the new member is
in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the
security of the North Atlantic Area.56
1. Partnership for Peace
All aspirant states must already be part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). 57
The Study highlights the PfP’s importance in what it terms the “evolutionary
process of the enlargement of NATO.”58 Participation in the PfP program gives
access for aspirant Members to a menu of tools laying the groundwork for an
accession process. Such tools include initiatives to develop interoperability and
build capacity and support for political, defense and security related reforms.
Individual Partnership Action Plans and the Annual National Program—the
most demanding tool within the PfP toolkit—allow also for Allies to assess
progress in the reforms undertaken by participating partners.59
However, following the accessions of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland in 1999, Allies sought to introduce a more formal and graduated structure
to the discussions with aspirant states beyond the standard PfP tools.60 This led
to the introduction in April 1999 of the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which
has been the mechanism through which Allies and an aspirant state have
discussed preparations for possible membership in all accessions since.61
2. Membership Action Plan
The MAP is divided into five chapters, encompassing: political and
economic issues, defense and military issues, resource issues, security issues,

56
See Membership Action Plan (MAP), NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., ch. V (1999) [hereinafter MAP],
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm.
57
See Partnership for Peace: Framework Document Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (1994),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24469.htm?selectedLocale=en. [hereinafter PfP].
58
Study on NATO Enlargement, supra note 26, ¶ 4.
59
PfP, supra note 57.
60
See MAP, supra note 56.
61
See id. Bulgaria Estonia Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia in 2004,
Croatia and Albania in 2009, and most recently Montenegro in 2017, id.
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and legal issues.62 Each Chapter of the MAP identifies a non-exhaustive list of
issues that might be discussed and highlights potential mechanisms through
which preparation for possible membership can be carried forward. As such, the
MAP gives a more systematic means to apply the principles identified in the
1995 Study to an individual aspirant and to allow them to access tools to address
areas where a need for further action is identified.
Undertaking a MAP places no obligations on an aspirant state. Such a state
sets its own objectives and targets and draws up its own annual national
program—as described above in respect of the PfP—based on whichever of the
listed activities they consider would most assist them in their preparations.63
Equally, participation in the MAP does not imply any time frame for, nor any
guarantee of, eventual membership. Instead, the annual national program forms
the basis for regular exchanges between the MAP State and the Allies in a North
Atlantic Council (NAC) +1 format, allowing Allies to keep track of aspirant
State’s progress and provide feedback.64 The format also enables meetings with
representatives of NATO International Staff to discuss particular issues drawn
from the MAP.
3. Accession Talks
The formal accession process is commenced by a NAC decision to invite a
state or states to join the Alliance by commencing accession talks.65 This
decision is taken by consensus and is not yet the invitation to accede provided
for in Article 10 itself.66 Following the decision, the Secretary General will
formally ask the invitee or invitees to begin accession talks.67
The accession talks themselves are a formal opportunity for the invitee to
confirm their willingness and ability to meet the political, legal and military
obligations and commitments of NATO membership. They take place over two
sessions, with the first discussing political and defense or military issues—
essentially the conditions provided for in Article 10.68 The second session then
62

Membership Action Plan (MAP), NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (1999) [hereinafter MAP 1999],
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm.
63
See MAP, supra note 56; PfP, supra note 57.
64
See MAP, supra note 56.
65
Enlargement, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (FEB. 15, 2019), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_49212.htm?selectedLocale=en.
66
67
68

Id.
Id.
Id.
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covers the more technical matters of resources, security and legal issues.69 Legal
issues will include discussion of the NATO legal acquis, considered in Section
D below and also any aspects of national law with the potential to impact the
obligations and commitments the acceding State will assume.
With the introduction of the MAP in particular, the formal accession talks
are to a large extent confirmatory of the extensive exchanges that would have
already taken place before an invitation to accession talks was extended. The
talks conclude with the invitee submitting a timetable for the completion of
necessary reforms, which may continue even after the acceding State has
become a member of the Alliance.70
4. Letter of Intent
On completion of accession talks, the invitee provides a letter of intent from
its foreign minister addressed to the Secretary General, which confirms its
acceptance of the obligations and commitments of membership.71 The letter is
significant from a legal perspective because it provides the mechanism by which
an acceding state confirms its willingness to abide by commitments that are not
explicit obligations in the Treaty itself, but are nonetheless critical for the new
state’s effective participation in the Organization—see Section D on NATO’s
legal acquis below. The letter typically confirms that the invitee:






69
70
71
72
73

is willing to meet the requirements of NATO membership as laid out
in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, and to meet all other
political and legal commitments of the Alliance, including with regard
to third countries;72
is committed to accede to the legal agreements and protocols requiring
an invitation by the present Member States of the Alliance, as well as
to the other legal instruments required for functioning properly within
the Alliance;73
accepts NATO’s broad approach to security and defense outlined in its
Strategic Concept, intends to participate fully in NATO’s military
structure and collective defense planning processes and is willing to

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.; Study on NATO Enlargement, supra note 26.
See MAP (1999), supra note 62.
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commit forces and capabilities for the full range of Alliance
missions;74
undertakes to allocate sufficient budget resources for the
implementation of its commitments upon accession to the Alliance, to
contribute to the Civil Budget, the Military Budget, the NATO
Security Investment Program and the New NATO Headquarters
Project on the basis of the modalities discussed during the accession
talks and at the specific cost share agreed there;75
recognizes and accepts that the Alliance relies upon commonality of
views, based on the principle of consensus in decision-making and will
work for consensus in the Alliance;76
fully supports the continued openness of the Alliance in accordance
with the Treaty and the relevant Summit Declarations; and77
has developed a program for the continuation of reforms covering
specific issues and reforms upon which, as a result of the accession
talks, and taking into account Allied guidance, further progress is
expected before and after accession in order to enhance their
contribution to the Alliance, and is committed to fulfilling this
program.78

5. Decision to Invite Under Article 10 of the Treaty
The letter of intent paves the way for the Allies to decide to invite an aspirant
to accede to the Treaty. This decision is effected through the unanimous
agreement of an accession protocol for one or more acceding States. The
agreement of a protocol also provides an opportunity to amend the Treaty to
facilitate a particular accession, if needed—for example, the amendment of
Article 6, as was the case with respect to Turkey.79 It is also worth noting the
use made of the preamble of the Accession Protocol for Germany to highlight

74
Id.; see Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supra note 5.
75
See MAP (1999), supra note 62.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
See Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, supra note 18.
Although as made clear in the 1995 Study, since new members should expect to enjoy the same rights and
obligations as existing members of the Alliance, there must be no “second tier” security guarantees or members
within the Alliance, and no modification of those rights in the Washington Treaty for those who join. Study on
NATO Enlargement, supra note 26, ¶ 68.
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political considerations that were fundamental to the Allies’s agreement to make
the invitation.80
Otherwise, the protocol is a relatively straightforward legal text, containing
an operative provision instructing usually the Secretary General to
communicate, on behalf of the Parties to the Treaty, the invitation to accede to
the Treaty. The accession protocol enters into force once the U.S. Government—
as depository for the Treaty—has received notification from each Party of its
acceptance of the protocol, in accordance with that Party’s national processes.81
Once the accession protocol is in force, the Secretary General transmits the
formal invitation letter to the acceding State. There is no prescribed time within
which this will be done, and questions of choreography can become complex.82
For example, if more than one country is acceding the question could arise
as to whether either of the acceding States needs to themselves agree to the
accession of the other and participate in the accession protocol. Such difficulties
are avoided if the accessions occur simultaneously and for that reason, where
there are multiple accessions, each would ideally deposit its instrument of
accession to the Treaty with the Government of the United States simultaneously
and become parties to the Treaty at the same time.83
The accession to the Alliance of the future Republic of North Macedonia
raised similar questions of choreography with respect to the signing of the
accession protocol, given the parallel processes ongoing between Athens and
Skopje in implementation of the resolution reached on the name issue and the
challenges of coordinating the internal processes of the twenty-nine Nations
with respect to authorization to sign the accession protocol before the text of the
Protocol could be settled.84
D. Current Practice—Adoption of the NATO Legal Acquis
By becoming party to the Treaty, an acceding State takes on the overarching
obligations of membership of the Alliance. At the same time, effective
participation in the Alliance’s work depends on a much wider set of binding
80
See Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct.
23, 1954.
81
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art.10; Enlargement, supra note 65.
82
See Enlargement, supra note 65.
83
Study on NATO Enlargement, supra note 26, ¶ 30.
84
See Relations with the Republic of North Macedonia, supra note 3.
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commitments—both legal and political—known as the NATO legal acquis,
without which accession to the Treaty may not occur.85
The NATO legal acquis comprises broadly two components:
First are the decisions of the North Atlantic Council that are still standing on
the date of accession. NAC decisions are binding on the Member States of the
Alliance and, depending on content, the obligations created can be either
political or legal.86 It is, therefore, important that newly acceded States are bound
by such obligations to the same extent as the other Allies, and, as set out above,
the mechanism used for this purpose is the letter of intent.
In the letter of intent, the aspirant State commits itself to meet all other
political and legal commitments of the Alliance, including with regard to third
countries. It also accepts NATO’s broad approach to security and defense
outlined in its Strategic Concept and expresses its intention to participate fully
in NATO’s military structure and collective defense planning processes. Finally,
it confirms that it is willing to commit forces and capabilities for the full range
of Alliance missions.87
Second, there are a number of key treaties to which new Allies are expected
to become a party in accordance with their respective domestic constitutional
procedures.88 Again, the letter of intent contains a broad commitment to accede
to the legal agreements and protocols that require an invitation by the present
Member States of the Alliance, as well as to the other legal instruments required
to function properly within the Alliance.
Because of their practical importance, there is a particular expectation that
an acceding Member State will sign and ratify the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement and its Paris Protocol as soon as it becomes a Member of the
Alliance. 89 These treaties underpin the presence in one Ally of, in the former
case, the forces of another Ally, and in the latter the staff of NATO’s
international military headquarters.

85

See MAP (1999), supra note 62.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See Agreement Among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States Participating
in the Partnership for Peace Regarding the Status of Their Forces, art. 2, June 19, 1995; Protocol on the Status
of International Military Headquarters Set up Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Aug. 28, 1952.
86
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In due course, though of less immediate operational importance, a new Ally
is expected to become a party to the Ottawa Agreement, providing inter alia for
the status of the Organization, as well as its civilian staff, and representatives of
Nations.90 A new Ally is also expected to become party to the 1994 Brussels
Agreement, which provides for the status of missions and representatives of third
states to the Organization.91
Additionally, there are certain technical agreements covering intellectual
property and the security of information to which the new Ally is expected to
accede.92
Finally, a new Ally will need to determine its relationship with the NATO
agencies—the support and executive branches of subsidiary bodies created by
the NAC pursuant to Article 9 of the Treaty, and to which the Ottawa Agreement
applies.
A new Ally will automatically become a member of the NATO Support and
Procurement Organisation (NSPO), the NATO Communications and
Information Organisation (NCIO) and the NATO Science and Technology
Organization (STO), as their respective Charters have, since 2012, each
provided that all NATO States are members.93
In contrast, the Charters of the other Agencies provide that a NATO Member
State may become a member on the basis of a “unanimous affirmative decision”
of the other Nations participating in the Agency, and subject to the conditions as
agreed between those participating Nations and the prospective new Member
State. A special case is the NATO Battlefield Information Collection and
Exploitation System (BICES), which has been transformed by the NAC into

90
Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, National Representatives and
International Staff signed in Ottawa, Sept. 20, 1951.
91
Agreement on the status of Missions and Representatives of third States to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, Sept. 14, 1994.
92
See William G. Gapcynski, NATO Agreement on the Communication of Technical Information for
Defense Purposes 6 INT’L L. 359, 359–60 (1972); Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
for the Security of Information, Mar. 6, 1997; Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for
Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information, Sec. II, June 18, 1964; Protocol Amending the Security Annex to
the Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information,
June 2, 1998; NATO Agreement for the Mutual Safeguarding of Secrecy of Inventions Relating to Defence and
for which Applications for Patents Have Been Made, Sept. 21, 1960.
93
Organisations and Agencies, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/topics_66470.htm.
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what is termed a “Group,” with a charter of its own.94 Participation in the BICES
Group is subject to approval of the North Atlantic Council.95
CONCLUSION
Over the twenty years since the first round of post-Cold War accessions, the
Organization has put in place what is now a more settled structure and set of
principles within which to consider and manage the pathway to accession, whilst
retaining the flexibility to take account of the particular political and security
context in which that accession takes place.
The implementation of Article 10 today remains true to the conception of
the original parties to the Treaty: that the security of the North Atlantic Area
could only be effectively assured by providing not only for the security of its
existing Members, but for that of other countries whose security is intrinsically
and strategically interdependent with their own.
At the same time, present day accession to the Alliance should be understood
not only through the analysis of Article 10 itself, and through the undertaking of
the obligations of the Treaty, but also by the gradual process of political reform
and military integration represented by the MAP and the assumption of the
obligations of the wider NATO legal acquis.

94
See generally BICES-Archived 06/2003, FORECAST INT’L, https://www.forecastinternational.com/
archive/disp_pdf.cfm?DACH_RECNO=474.
95
Id.

